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Abstract. The IAEA bases its technical and scientific Programme on contributions from the Member State 
Support Programmes (MSSP). The European Commission Cooperative Support Programme (EC-SP) 
started in 1981 to support IAEA‟s activities in the field of nuclear safeguards. Since its beginning, the EC-
SP has been operated by the European Commission‟s Joint Research Centre (JRC) and its institutes at Ispra-
Italy, Geel-Belgium and Karlsruhe-Germany. The EC-SP tasks provide technology and expertise in many 
technical areas related to the effective implementation of safeguards verification measures including the 
detection of undeclared materials, activities, and facilities. The paper will detail the main activities of the 
EC-SP in recent years, namely (a) the specific work as part of tasks with well-defined milestones and 
deadlines, (b) training activities and (c) the technical consultancy support to the many IAEA meetings and 
expert groups. 
1. Introduction 
The European Commission Collaborative Support Programme – EC-SP, to the IAEA was officially created 
in 1981 with an exchange of letters between Directors of the European Commission and the IAEA. Since 
then the EC-SP has been involved in more than 110 tasks in different Safeguards areas.  
This paper details the main EC-SP activities. It starts with some historical background and description of 
the current modes of operation, including the close collaboration with the European Commission‟s 
Directorate General on Energy, in charge of the implementation of the EURATOM treaty. It then highlights 
some recent contributions of the EC-SP and ends with some discussion on current practices and future. 
2. Historical Background 
The IAEA was created in 1957, the same year the Treaty of Rome – instituting the European Economic 
Community, and the EURATOM Treaty – instituting the European Atomic Energy Community, were 
signed. As a consequence of the EURATOM Treaty, an executive Commission of EURATOM (later 
merged into the Commission of the European Communities which later became the current European 
Commission) was mandated to implement the EURATOM Treaty, including all Nuclear Safeguards and 
verification measures.  
In 1970 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – NPT – entered into force and the IAEA received the 
mandate to create and implement an International Nuclear Safeguards regime.  
Considering the technical character of Nuclear Verification methodologies, there was much technical 
collaboration between the IAEA and the European Commission‟s Joint Research Centre – which had been 
created in 1959 with the specific role of fostering joint European research in nuclear energy related matters.  
After the creation in 1977 of the Member State Support Programme – MSSP, the European Commission 
joined the MSSP in May 1981 with an exchange of Letters establishing a “formal Cooperative Support 
Programme between the IAEA and EURATOM in the field of Safeguards Research and Development”. The 
signatories were Mr Sigvard Eklund, Director General of the IAEA and Mr Wilhelm Haferkamp, the 
German Commissioner for External Relations including Nuclear Affairs of the Commission of the 
European Communities (President: Gaston Thorn). 
The exchanged letters indicated that “the programme will cover the following areas of R&D activity”:  
a) Surveillance and Containment 
b) Measurement technology 
 
 
c) Training Course 
d) Information data, treatment and evaluations 
As it can be seen these areas are still very much updated in terms of the current activities between the EC-
SP and the IAEA. Table 2 illustrates the first five EC-SP tasks. 
Task No. Title Accepted 
EC-B-00071 Inspector Training Course in NDA and DA 1986 
EC-E-00177 Modular Laser Surveillance System (LASSY) 06-1987 
EC-E-00178 Image Processing System for Film and Videotape Review 06-1987 
EC-X-00179 Feasibility Study of a PWR Fuel Assembly Sealing System 1989 
EC-E-00182 Identification of Items by Means of Surface Topography 1989 
 Table 1: First EC-SP Tasks  (Source: IAEA SPRICS) 
3. EC-SP Modes of Operation 
From an operational point of view the European Commission‟s Joint Research Centre (JRC) operates the 
EC-SP. Indeed, three JRC institutes with an active work programme in the field of Nuclear Safeguards are 
actively collaborating with the IAEA within the framework of EC-SP. These are: 
- Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen (IPSC), Ispra, Italy 
- Institute for Reference Measurements and Materials (IRMM), Geel, Belgium 
- Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), Karlsruhe, Germany 
The European Commission Directorate General on Energy – ENER, in charge of the implementation of the 
EURATOM Treaty, is kept informed about all IAEA requests and progress and implementation of current 
tasks. On a case by case basis and whenever appropriate, ENER proposes trilateral collaboration schemes 
for the execution of specific tasks. 
As any other MSSP, IAEA‟s Support Programme Coordination Group meets twice a year with the 
coordinator of the EC-SP and specific task officers for overall task review meetings. 
3.1 Research and Development Tasks 
The different meetings between JRC and IAEA staff contribute to a widespread dissemination of 
knowledge: 
- JRC staff is aware about IAEA needs and orientations.  
- IAEA staff learns about recent research activities, including results, investments, etc. 
- The regular MSSP coordinator meetings and IAEA R&D reports also contribute to this exchange of 
knowledge 
These bilateral exchanges are beneficial as they contribute to bring together end-users and developers. 
Further, the good understanding of IAEA needs often influence future JRC multi-annual work programmes. 
On an annual basis, the definition of objectives and deliverables for the different groups also reflect the 
current IAEA tasks. 
3.2 Expert Meetings and Workshops 
JRC staff regularly participates to meetings, expert networks, workshops, etc. organised by the IAEA. 
These, again, contribute to a better understanding of IAEA needs in specific areas and are beneficial in 
looking ahead for future research avenues, eventually to be implemented in forthcoming years.  
 
 
 
3.3 Collaboration with other Support Programmes  
Given the organisation of the European Union and the existence of the ESARDA association – focusing on 
R&D for Safeguards, it is considered positive to disseminate JRC current R&D activities for the IAEA to 
other EU Member States – MS – with an active MSSP.  
Ten EU MS participate at IAEA‟s MSSP: Belgium, Czech Rep, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and UK. These Member States are invited to participating at the EC-SP‟s 
Annual Review Meeting. In some cases, when discussing specific tasks or IAEA requests, it is beneficial to 
extend the discussion to other Support Programmes. This practice has been found useful both from the 
IAEA‟s perspective and from the participating MSSPs. Not only the discussions are richer, but also it is 
possible to better coordinate and focus on future efforts and initiatives.  
4. EC-SP Today 
In Summer 2010, the situation of the European Commission‟s Support Programme was as follows: 
NDA: Equipment, Modelling and Measurements 7 
Sealing, Containment and Surveillance 6 
Analytical and Reference Techniques 6 
Support To Safeguards in Japan: JNFL And JMOX Projects 7 
Information Technologies for Non-Proliferation 3 
Training 6 
Other 3 
Total 38 
Table 2: Number of tasks in different technical areas, situation of the EC-SP in Summer 2010 
Further to the execution of the tasks, the EC-SP also regularly participates at Technical Meetings, Expert 
Groups, Networks and Consultants Group Meetings organised by the IAEA.   
5. Recent Highlights of the EC-SP 
5.1 Reference Materials  
The IAEA continued to receive reference materials and particles as requested. In particular, the use of the 
new uranium IRMM-3100a: 233U/235U/236U/238U=1/1/1/1 "quad" isotopic reference material was 
demonstrated [EC A 00318 – Special Reference and Source Materials for DA]. This new isotope reference 
material is ideal for verifying the inter-calibration of multi-detector systems in isotope mass spectrometry. 
As a result JRC-IRMM certified reference materials are now regularly applied in IAEA SGAS 
measurements strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA Analytical Services.  
 
Figure 1: Performance of the Modified Total Evaporation method for minor uranium ratios n(
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U)/n(
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and n(
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Associated to the work in reference materials, advanced training techniques in Mass Spectroscopy were 
developed and experience transferred to the IAEA [EC B 01752 – Mass Spectrometry Training]. In 
particular, there were courses in thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS). The capabilities and sample 
throughput for measurements of the minor uranium isotope ratios have been improved by implementing the 
so-called "modified total evaporation technique" at the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Services (SGAS-
Seibersdorf). The performance of the MTE method for the minor uranium ratios n(
234
U)/n(
238
U) and 
n(
236
U)/n(
238
U) is seen in Figure 1. It is well below the performance limit for the entire range of ratios as 
required by the IAEA [1]. The excellent performance of this technique was demonstrated and is considered 
to be officially accepted for safeguards measurements at the IAEA SGAS. 
In 2010 JRC-IRMM provided results to the IAEA on verification measurements of the recently domestic 
produced and certified JAEA LSD spikes and of batches of IAEA LSD spikes used for measurement of 
uranium and plutonium in fissile material control at the onsite laboratory in Rokkasho [EC A 1806 – 
Verification of mixed U-Pu Spikes] [2]. The reference materials used to accomplished this task were subject 
to a an inter-calibration campaign using state-of-the art measurement procedures carried out linking IRMM 
plutonium spike reference materials to underpin the confidence in the use of these IRMM reference 
materials for safeguards verification and environmental measurements. The compatibility of selected 
IRMM plutonium reference materials was demonstrated and the traceability of the certified values of the 
plutonium isotopic contents to the SI was confirmed. In addition this study was also linked to IRMM‟s 
successful participation in the external plutonium interlaboratory comparison programme EQRAIN-11, 
demonstrating IRMM‟s measurement capabilities for plutonium analysis. 
5.2 Large Geometry Secondary Ion Mass Spectroscopy – LG-SIMS 
The analysis of environmental particle samples is one of the means to detect the occurrence of undeclared 
activities dealing with enrichment and processing of nuclear materials. The techniques used today have 
proven to be effective for Safeguards measures and is a corner stone in the implementation of IAEA's 
additional protocol. For many years JRC-ITU has been involved with the development of novel analysis 
techniques aimed at the accurate identification of the constituents of fine particulate material. The ultimate 
goal is to perform accurate and precise measurements, determining the isotopic composition of the particles 
selected. This is of utmost relevance for safeguards as these particles are representative of the original 
material and their composition provides specific information about the source and, often, about the 
chemical/industrial processes used [3]. The results of this R&D effort are regularly communicated to the 
IAEA which, eventually, incorporates them as part of their standard analysis methodology and procedures. 
  
Figure 2: Example of JRC-ITU Automated Particle Measurement (APM) screening software that was 
recently developed by the company Cameca in cooperation with JRC-ITU, and a photo of an LG-SIMS 
from NORDSIM laboratory, Stockholm (equal to the one to be soon installed at JRC-ITU). 
JRC-ITU is currently in the process of acquiring a Large Geometry Secondary Ion Mass Spectroscopy 
instrument – LG-SIMS. This instrument is the very same as the one that the IAEA will have in a near future 
as part of the new SAL laboratories. LG-SIMS improves the performance in uranium particle analysis, 
namely, high sensitivity at high mass resolution. Common molecular interferences are removed effortless, 
thus improving the minor isotope measurements. The results of uranium isotopic measurements are 
 
 
comparable to the best available TIMS measurements. The implementation of LG-SIMS will strengthen the 
Safeguards capabilities as it combines highest performance with a timeliness that does not exist today with 
the current use of small geometry SIMS and the fission track – TIMS method. This instrument also 
improves the detection capabilities of particles in a large matrix of other material. 
5.3 COMPUCEA: Combined Procedure for Uranium Concentration and Enrichment Assay 
COMPUCEA [Task EC A 01507] (Combined Procedure for Uranium Concentration and Enrichment 
Assay) is used for on-site analytical measurements in support of joint Euratom-IAEA inspections during 
physical inventory verification (PIV) campaigns in European Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel 
fabrication plants. The analytical technique involves the accurate determination of the uranium element 
content by energy-dispersive X-ray absorption edge spectrometry (L-edge densitometry) and of the 235U 
enrichment by gamma spectrometry with a LaBr3(Ce) detector. For evaluation of the LaBr3 spectra a 
modified version of the NaIGEM code is used, which has recently been adapted to handle the presence of 
reprocessed uranium.  
   
Figure 3: Procedure for the COMPUCEA technique and equipment 
Following the successive and extensive evaluation of COMPUCEA‟s performance [4], both in the 
laboratory and in field, the technique is now proposed to be used by the IAEA outside the European Union. 
First tests have already occurred and training actions are being prepared. 
5.4 Ultrasonic Seals 
JRC developed an ultrasonic seal [Task EC-E-01559] that is used in its different versions by EURATOM 
and IAEA Safeguards systems. The internal structure of the ultrasonic seal comprises a unique non-
reproducible identity and a frangible element (integrity) which breaks when an attempt is made to remove 
the seal from the sealed item. The reading device consists of a transducer which generates an ultrasonic 
signal and senses the reflected signal. The transducer rotates above the sealing bolt recording the ultrasonic 
echoes reflected over a complete revolution. 
The core of the ultrasonic seal (photo to the very right, below) is a cylindrical assembly containing its 
unique identity and an integrity feature which breaks when opened. This assembly is radiation resistant and 
particularly reliable even under very harsh environmental conditions.  
The identification feature is an assembly of several discs randomly stamped which are stacked in a random 
disposition and brazed together to form a univocal identity (second from left photo). Brazing paste is put in 
several parts of the stack in a quantity that will adequately braze the disks, but not fill all the holes. This is 
done by heating them up to 1000°C for several minutes in the furnace. As the diffusion of the brazing 
follows a random process, it is not possible to predict the identities that will be produced. The parts 
providing identity and integrity are then brazed together to form the core of the ultrasonic seals. This core is 
then welded into the top of the seal. The bodies of the seals are designed according to each application. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Core of ultrasonic seals. 
Following the validation by an independent vulnerability assessment study, JRC ultrasonic seals are now 
classified as category A equipment and are used in nuclear installations in Romania, Canada and Pakistan. 
5.5 3D Laser range Finder for Design Information Verification 
Design Information Verification – DIV – is becoming increasingly important in International Safeguards as 
a way to verify that the plant set-up is consistent with the declared intent of its activities. Because of the 
complexity of nuclear installations, design verification can be extremely challenging and time consuming. 
Within the framework of Task EC-E-01425, JRC-IPSC developed a 3D laser based tool for Design 
Information Verification (DIV) purposes [5]. The DIV system is divided in two main components: (i) a 
commercial off-the-shelf laser range scanner for data acquisition, i.e., capture the 3D coordinates, of a given 
environment with millimetre accuracy and (ii) a suite of JRC developed software applications needed to 
create an accurate 3D reference model, automatically analyse a verification model and detect changes, as 
well as manage all acquired and processed datasets, including secure storage and data authentication. This 
JRC developed system – 3DLR – is currently being used by the IAEA and Euratom.  
     
Figure 5: 3D Laser Range Finder used in the 3DLR, and examples of 3D capturing of a complex scene 
including automated 3D scene change detection – for verification purposes. 
5.6 Development of an integrated approach to GCEP safeguards 
The current IAEA strategy on safeguarding enrichment plants is still based on the results of the Hexapartite 
Working Group dating back to the early eighties. This working group tried to develop a system of mutually 
(IAEA and operators) acceptable assurances allowing the inspection of GCEP without disclosing sensitive 
technological information. Since then a lot of technological improvements have occurred, more countries 
had access to gas centrifuge technology and undeclared enrichment programmes have been discovered. All 
these factors call for an upgrade of the safeguards approach and the IAEA has started a process of 
modernisation of the inspection concept at GCEP‟s. 
The current system relies on regular inspections for nuclear material accountancy based on NDA 
verifications (mostly on product cylinders) complemented by containment and surveillance measures. In 
addition LFUA (Limited Frequency Unannounced Access) to the cascade hall are allowed.  
JRC is working in the frame of the EC-SP to develop an innovative integrated approach to GCEP 
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safeguards that could improve effectiveness in the verifications of theis kind of plants. The approach is 
based on three pillars: 
- Continuous monitoring of load cells at feed/withdrawal stations, complemented with cascade 
modelling, aiming to a nearly real time accountancy (NRTA) of material in the plant 
- Tracking/identification/authentication of cylinder flow in the plant 
- Improved NDA techniques for verification of cylinders 
The first goal is currently not fully addressed in an ongoing SP task, even though it is partly included in the 
proposal 10/TAU-005 “Evaluation of data collected from operator systems at enrichment plants” aiming to 
the analysis and evaluation of operator provided data at the GB-II plant. The general principle is to acquire 
continuously cylinder weight data from the load cells at the feed/product/tail stations (mostly provided by 
operator equipment) and to analyse them in order to confirm the plant operation according to the expected 
behaviour and to exclude the presence of undeclared operations and/or the diversion of material. Since the 
monitoring is done only at the endpoints of the plant and no physical parameters are measured in the 
cascade hall, there is the need to develop theoretical models simulating the functionality and operation of 
the centrifuges and cascades in order to be able to analyse and correlate the signals measured at the entry 
and exit points and to conclude on the compliance of the operations with declarations. 
The second part is done under task EC-E-1696 “L2IS: Laser Item Identification System” [] and aims to 
have a real-time tracking of flow of cylinders in the plant, complemented with identification and 
authentication features. The L2IS is capable of monitoring all transfers of UF6 cylinders between process 
areas by uniquely identifiying each cylinder through exploring the unique 3D microstructure of each 
cylinder‟s surface. It has been demonstrated that every cylinder has a unique „fingerprint‟ which remains 
stable even under extreme environmental conditions. The L2IS system is composed of a portable unit, 
operated in attended mode, and a fixed installed unit, operated without inspector presence. An inspector, 
using the portable unit, acquires the fingerprints of a given set of feed cylinders intended to be used over the 
forthcoming months. The fixed system monitors the flow of previously identified cylinders in a transfer 
corridor. This system is coupled with standard video surveillance that can remotely transmit state of health 
information to IAEA Headquarters. The video surveillance can be interfaced with electronic seals applied to 
the cylinders to record and display seals data (e.g. status, time/date of application). The integration of data 
from the L2IS with data from weighing and NDA stations is foreseen to monitor and verify all transfers. 
This will provide a high deterrence of diversion or substitution, and an increased probability of detection 
thereof. After one year of field testing, successful results of the L2IS have been reported [6]. 
    
Figure 6: L2IS Portable and Fixed reading Stations  
Finally the improved NDA on cylinders is executed under task EC-A-1687 “State of the Art of NDA 
Techniques Applicable to UF6 Cylinders”. The current verification system on cylinders relies on accurate 
weight measurements at the accountancy scales and on gamma spectrometry for enrichment measurements. 
Current technology on gamma spectrometry does not allow to reach the wished accuracy in the cylinders 
used at GCEP plants: the large cylinder wall attenuates too much the soft X-rays needed to perform spectral 
analysis with intrinsic calibration methods and the measurements done based on the enrichment-meter 
principle require an accurate knowledge of the wall thickness in order to correct accurately for the 
attenuation [7]. JRC has analysed the potentiality to improve the measurements of cylinders using passive 
neutron measurements. This alternative technique is based on the measurement in a well controlled 
 
 
geometrical configuration of the total neutron source generated by (alpha,n) reactions within UF6. This is 
not a direct indicator of enrichment since the main contribution to the neutron source comes from 234U. 
Nevertheless 234U/235U ratio is constant within a plant and known when the enriched UF6 is directly 
produced from natural feed, which is the most common operational case. The application of the technique 
could be problematic to cases such as blending of products, reprocessed uranium, re-enrichment of tails, 
products from enriched feed. 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
JRC‟s experience in operating the European Commission Support Programme, in line with the collaboration 
of DG-ENERGY, has been very positive. The franc dialogue with the IAEA led to a programme of applied 
research targeted to Nuclear Safeguards applications. This programme has produced several pieces of work 
with relevance to international Safeguards stakeholders. 
Discussing about the IAEA Member State Support Programme, one can highlight the role of an MSSP as a 
facilitator between National, Regional and International Safeguards. The organisations implementing the 
MSSP must have a deep understanding of IAEA needs and translate these needs into technical research and 
development work.  
Further, the participation in an MSSP makes people, and specially technical people, aware of IAEA 
Safeguards and the continuous challenge in “raising the bar”. 
The existence of an MSSP creates, somehow, a sense of partial ownership in what concerns the 
implementation of International Safeguards. This makes politicians and decision makers more informed 
about IAEA Safeguards, its rules, modes of operation and technical requirements.  
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